The problem with such a constellation of interest rates and monetary policy is the high incentive seemingly safer speculative profits for foreign investors and domestic borrowers. Attempts by individual countries to stop the inflow of capital controls have proven generally considered less effective. This experience has already had to make the Bundesbank in the years 1970-73, when it was in a similar situation (low dollar interest rates, fixed-dollar exchange rate, trial of an autonomous interest rate policy) inundated by massive capital inflows, although they had introduced far-reaching restrictions on capital movements. Brazil, Malaysia and Thailand have not been able to stop the crisis through controls on capital inflows. Chile is known as the most important evidence of the success of such regulations. However, it should be borne in mind that this country pursued a very flexible exchange rate management, in which it is only been partially possible to predict the change in the exchange rate.
In retrospect, it can be established for these crises, it would have been possible by an alternative policy mix of monetary policy to keep the issue of inflows as well as the foreign currency debt limits. This could for a greater range of variation in the change control requires to reduce the predictability of the speculators. Secondly, it would have been necessary to rely more on macroeconomic stabilization on interest than on the exchange rate.
Concretely, for example, would Thailand in 1994 or 1995 a limited appreciation of the Bath can allow then to drive by the increased level of devaluation. Such a downward slide would have opened the possibility of making a rate hike, without triggering speculative inflows. In one aimed at the prevention of inflows macroeconomic policies, the risk of speculative outflows would have been much lower, even though it had not been ruled out in principle. For the stability of national financial markets it would have been advantageous that had existed no incentives in the alternative policy mix to include foreign currency loans.
3. Crises in 'Flexible Exchange Rates' “灵活汇率”中的危机
In response to the bad experience with fixed or pre-announced exchange rates, many central banks have opted for a policy of 'managed floating'. This strategy may not with 'flexible exchange rates' - be confused - in the sense of purely market-determined exchange rates. A number of studies have shown that even countries that are led by the International Monetary Fund in the category 'independent floating', specifically through interventions take on what is happening in the forex market influence.
Thus, there are relatively few countries that operate consistently over a long period a policy of 'flexible courses'. This as 'fear of floating' Marked phenomenon is due to the fact that it can also lead to critical developments in purely market-determined prices. This is because market-determined exchange rates tend to behave quite differently over longer periods than would appear from the underlying macroeconomic data appears. A good example of this is the sharp depreciation of the euro in 2000, which was a complete contrast to the fact that the euro zone in a considerably better macroeconomic condition was at this time than in the entire nineties. This single finding is confirmed by a wealth of econometric studies.
